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The Utility Premium of Friedman and Savage,




Recently, the literature has paid significant attention to the concept of utility
premium. A risk’s utility premium is defined as the loss in expected utility
caused by the risk. This concept was introduced by Friedman and Savage
(1948) more than sixty years ago; however, it has been largely ignored by
the literature with the rare exception of Hanson and Menezes’ study (1971),
which promotes the concept in a discussion of the prudence notion.
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) are among the first to rediscover the
power of this concept and use it to show that the direction of preference for
a particular class of lottery pairs is equivalent to signing a utility function’s
nth derivative. Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) use it to study the link between
the signs of cross derivatives of a utility function and individual preference
within a particular class of simple lotteries. Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008)
use it to establish a new measure for the intensity of downside risk aversion.
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Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2009) explain in detail the relevance of this
concept for decision making under risk. Denuit and Eeckhoudt (2010a, b)
use the concept to give a general foundation for higher order Arrow-Pratt
risk aversion measures and develop some stronger measures of higher-order
risk attitudes. More recently, Liu and Meyer (2013) use the ratio of utility
premiums to examine the partial order of nth-degree Ross more risk averse
while Crainich et al. (2013) use the concept of utility premium to charac-
terize the preferences of agents who they call (mixed) risk lovers.1
In this short article we show that the utility premium normalized by the
marginal utility is explained by the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion measure in
exactly the same way as the risk premium of Pratt (1964), that is, the greater
the risk aversion measure, the greater a risk’s utility premium normalized
by the marginal utility.
Moreover, we show that the concept of utility premium can also be used
to explain comparative prudence. More precisely, we show that the greater
the prudence measure, the greater the utility premium for disaggregating a
certain loss of wealth and a zero-mean risk normalized by the utility func-
tion’s second derivative.
The structure of the remaining paper is as follows. In Section 2, we in-
troduce the concept of utility premium. In Section 3, we use utility premium
to explain comparative risk aversion. In Section 4, we use utility premium
to explain comparative prudence. Section 5 concludes the paper.
1Other related studies which use the concept of utility premium include Menegatti
(2007) and Jindapon (2010).
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2 The Utility Premium
Throughout this paper, we assume that utility functions are strictly in-
creasing, strictly concave, and thrice continuously differentiable. Given a
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(x), we denote the Arrow-Pratt
absolute risk aversion measure by R(x), i.e., R(x) = −u′′(x)/u′(x). Given
a risk ˜, its utility premium is defined as u(w)−Eu(w+ ˜). As in Crainich
and Eeckhoudt (2008), we normalize the utility premium by the marginal
utility at the initial wealth: u(w)−Eu(w+˜)
u′(w) .
3 Comparative Risk Aversion
Let u(w) and v(w) be two utility functions with Arrow-Pratt absolute risk
aversion measures Ru(w) and Rv(w) respectively. First consider a small





 . If, at a point w, Ru(w) > Rv(w), for
such a small risk, we have u(w)−Eu(w+˜)
u′(w) >
v(w)−Ev(w+˜)
v′(w) . We show below
that the global property also holds.






























v′(w) always has [strictly] the same sign as x. Therefore, since the direction
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which is equivalent to
v(w+ ) − v(w)
v′(w)
−
u(w + ) − u(w)
u′(w)
≥ [>]0.
Taking expectations with respect to , we obtain the second inequality of
the proposition.
To prove the “if” part, by contradiction, suppose this is not true. Given
that u(x) and v(x) are twice continuously differentiable, there must exist
an interval [a, b] in which Ru(x) < [≤]Rv(x). By restricting the support









We may relate this result to Pratt’s (1964) result on risk premium and
comparative risk aversion. Given a risk ˜, the risk premium pi(w, ˜) at wealth
w is defined implicitly via u(w+E˜− pi(w, ˜)) = Eu(w+ ˜). He shows that
∀w, Ru(w) ≥ [>a.e.]Rv(w) if and only if ∀w and ∀˜, piu(w, ˜) ≥ [>]piv(w, ˜).
We have shown here that the utility premium of a risk normalized by the
marginal utility is explained by the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion measure in
exactly the same way as the risk premium.
4 Comparative Prudence
In this section we show that the concept of utility premium can also be used
to explain comparative prudence. We first recall two lotteries defined by
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006). Given k > 0 and a zero-mean risk ˜, let
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B3 = [−k; ˜] and A3 = [0; ˜− k] be two binary lotteries, the outcomes of
which are assumed to have equal probability.2
As is explained by Crainich et al. (2013), for a risk-averter, both a certain
loss in wealth −k and a zero-mean risk ˜ are bad outcomes. So the lottery
A3 combines the two bad outcomes while the lottery B3 disaggregates the
two bad outcomes, and
u(w− k) +Eu(w+ ˜)−Eu(w− k + ˜)− u(w)
is the utility premium for disaggregating the two bad outcomes.
Let Pu(x) and Pv(x) denote the absolute prudence of u(x) and v(x)
respectively. We have the following result.
Proposition 2 Assume that u(x) has positive third derivative. For ∀w,
Pu(w) ≥ [>a.e.]Pv(w) if and only if ∀x, ∀k > 0, and ∀ zero-mean ˜,
Eu(x− k + ˜)− u(x− k)−Eu(x+ ˜) + u(x)
u′′(x)
≥ [>]
Ev(x− k + ˜)− v(x− k)−Ev(x+ ˜) + v(x)
v′′(x)
. (1)
Proof: We only prove the non-strict version of the result. We first prove




[Eu′(x+ ˜)− u′(x)] ≥ [Ev′(x+ ˜)− v′(x)].









2Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) use the two lotteries to characterize prudence.
3This is obtained by replacing u(x) and v(x) by −u′(x) and −v′(x) respectively in the
proposition.
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In the meantime, as Pu(x) ≥ Pv(x),
v′′(x)
u′′(x)
is increasing. This implies for




u′′(y) . Moreover, since zero-mean ˜ and convex u
′(x)
imply Eu′(x+ ˜)− u′(x) ≥ 0,
∫ y
y−k [Eu










which is equivalent to Inequality (1). This proves the “only if” part.
The converse statement can be proved using a standard type of argument
by contradiction similar to that for Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
We give three remarks. (i) As was pointed out in the proof, since u(x)




′(x+ ˜)−u′(x)]dx ≤ 0. As agents are risk averse, this implies that
the left-hand side of Inequality (1) is always positive.
(ii) As was explained earlier, the numerator of the left [right] hand side
of Inequality (1) is the negative utility premium for disaggregating the two
bad outcomes ˜ and −k by u(x) [v(x)]. Thus the proposition tells us that the
greater the prudence measure the greater the utility premium for disaggre-
gating the two bad outcomes normalized by the negative second derivative
of the utility function.
(iii) The above result gives a different characterization of the prudence
measure from the one given by Chiu (2005). Chiu shows that an agent has
greater prudence than a reference agent if and only if his expected utility is
increased by a class of compensated downside risk increases which preserve
the expected utility of the reference agent.
It is interesting to relate this proposition to a result given by Crainich
and Eeckhoudt (2008) who use the same utility premium to explain the
downside risk aversion measure u′′′/u′. In their result they normalize the
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utility premium by the marginal utility, and show that when the risk is small,
the greater the ratio u′′′/u′, the greater the utility premium normalized
by the marginal utility. From the proposition we can obtain a sufficient
condition for an agent to have greater utility premium for disaggregating the
two bad outcomes normalized by the marginal utility than another agent in
the general case where the risk may not be small.
Corollary 1 Assume that u(x) has positive third derivative. If for ∀w,
Pu(w) ≥ Pv(w) and Ru(w) ≥ Rv(w), then for ∀w, ∀k > 0, and ∀ zero-mean
˜,
−
Eu(x− k + ˜)− u(x− k)−Eu(x+ ˜) + u(x)
u′(x)
≥ −
Ev(x− k + ˜)− v(x− k)− Ev(x+ ˜) + v(x)
v′(x)
. (2)
Proof: As earlier, we use Su and Sv to denote the left and right hand sides
of the Inequality (1) respectively. Then the left and right hand sides of the
Inequality (2) are equal to SuRu(w) and SvRv(w)respectively. Since for ∀w,
Pu(w) ≥ Pv(w), from Proposition 2, we have Inequality (1), i.e., Su ≥ Sv. In
the meantime we have, for ∀w, Ru(w) ≥ Rv(w). Noting that from Remark
(i) on Proposition 2, Su ≥ 0, we immediately obtain Inequality (2). Q.E.D.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that the utility premium of a risk normalized
by the marginal utility is explained by the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion mea-
sure in exactly the same way as the risk premium of Pratt. This bridges the
gap between the utility premium and the risk premium and gives an alter-
native characterization of Arrow-Pratt risk aversion. We have also shown
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that the greater the prudence measure, the greater the utility premium for
disaggregating a certain loss of wealth and a zero-mean risk normalized by
the utility function’s second derivative.
These results not only improve the understanding of comparative risk
aversion and comparative prudence, but also improve the understanding of
the concept of the utility premium, which has shown to be a useful tool for
research in decision making under risk.
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